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Abstract  
 This paper examines a major influence on the stock prices of a 
publicly traded football club, Juventus Football Club S.p.A., a professional 
Italian association football club. The underlying financial theory applied and 
tested in this paper is the news model. The news model considers changes in 
stock prices the consequence of unexpected new public information. 
Applying the news model to the sport industry, it can be considered that 
unexpected match results affect the stock price of the club. In addition, 
following the reversed news model, whether major corporate governance 
related events have any influence on stock prices is tested. This paper 
contributes to the literature on the impact of unexpected public information 
on stock prices. 
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Introduction 
 Based on the news model and the reversed news model, two 
determinants of stock prices are tested. The news model is tested by using 
signals identified as new public information. The fundamental assumption of 
the news model is that financial markets are efficient in a semi-strong form. 
Therefore, all publicly available information is incorporated into stock prices 
when the information is released. Previous studies on similar subjects tend to 
set financial earnings (earning announcements, dividend payouts etc.) as 
signals. However, it is usually difficult to collect these data in practice. 
These data are sporadically published with intervals spanning from a quarter 
to six months by public companies. Another issue is that data can be easily 
manipulated, i.e., some data are biased. This paper sets the match results of a 
publicly traded football club, Juventus Football Club S.p.A., as signals. An 
obvious advantage of this approach is that regular and frequent signals can 
be obtained. Football matches take place regularly in the competition season 
(normally once a week), when these signals frequently feed to the financial 
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market. Another advantage is the openness of signals, given that football 
matches are aired live and match results are observed spontaneously (cannot 
be manipulated). Moreover, football matches usually take place when the 
stock market is closed. The lag between match days and trading days gives 
investors sufficient time to analyze new information. According to the news 
model, only expectation errors, which are the differences between actual 
results and expected results, have impacts on stock prices. Therefore, this 
expectation error is marked as the signal and in turn an explanatory variable 
in this paper. Signals can be abstracted from the actual results. It is assumed 
that investors form some expectations for the outcome prior to the match. 
Following the example of Lehmann and Weigand (1998), the expectation is 
estimated using the betting odds for the game. Similar estimation is found in 
Dobson and Goddard (2001). Estimation of the reversed news model 
provides different results. Robustness checks are conducted to avoid pitfalls 
in the econometric specification. 
 The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes how data are 
processed and how stock price and stock index are calculated. It also 
interprets the betting odds for matches and the expectation errors. Section 4 
illustrates regressions of the stock prices on expectation errors on match days 
and in full sample range. Empirical evidence provides support for the theory. 
The reversed news model is discussed in Section 5. The reversed news 
model investigates any possible explanatory variables that have been omitted 
in the regressions. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix are found in 
Section 7. 
 
Related Literature 
 A great deal of research reveals that match results influence the stock 
prices of sport clubs. In general, there is a link between the performance of a 
football team and the revenue of the club. A partial selection of papers that 
support this idea are briefly mentioned here. Barajas, Fernández-Jardón and 
Crolley (2005) finds that there exists a non-linear relation between the match 
performance and the expected incomes, i.e., a better performance is a source 
of higher revenue for Spanish football clubs. Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) 
and Deloitte and Touche (1999, 2000b) both argue that good performance on 
the pitch leads to a high revenue income. The basic reason behind is the 
club's reputation. Football clubs make most of their revenue in three ways: 
selling broadcasting rights, selling tickets and merchandises, and receiving 
endorsements through commercial advertising and sponsoring. When 
football team performs well long enough, the club becomes more reputable 
and it can gain recognition in the public. Sales of tickets and team related 
merchandise will increase. Because of all the publicity, clubs will attract 
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more advertising opportunities or more sponsorship. When teams do well, 
they tend to stay longer in the competition. Thus, more can be gained for 
selling broadcasting rights. In the football industry, higher revenues mean 
higher profits. When teams perform well, investors' expectation of dividends 
goes up, so the stock price rises as well. As a result, the following two 
hypotheses are proposed: 
 H1: an unexpected won match influences stock prices positively. 
 H2: an unexpected lost match influences stock prices negatively. 
 It is also reasonable to assume that European games have a greater 
effect on stock prices than national games. The reason is that competitions 
among all football clubs across Europe are more appealing. Football clubs 
can obtain more financial benefits and sport benefits in European games. 
 
Data Processing 
 Stadtmann (2006) indicates that only the difference between the 
realized fundamentals and the expected fundamentals can be regarded as the 
news component. In other words, only expectation errors affect stock prices. 
The sample data set consists of all Italian Serie A and Champion League 
games played by Juventus Football Club from December 20th 2001 to May 
31st 2006. The share prices of Juventus and the index of Milan exchange in 
the same time span are also used. The share and index data provide detailed 
historical data for the two participants in the website. Only the closing prices 
for each are used in the analysis. Besides, instead of  using the actual price, 
the logarithms of both time series are used. Since football games usually take 
place in the afternoon or in the evening at weekends, every match related 
variable is attached to the following working day when financial market is 
open, e.g., if Juventus plays on Saturday, the game outcome corresponds to 
the following Monday's share price. It is innocuous to define a match day as 
a working day followed by a day when there is a match. Table 1 summarizes 
number of games played and categories. 
Table 1 Number of Games Played & Categories 
 Juventus Italian Serie A 
Juventus 
Champion League 
Inter Milan 
Italian Serie A 
Number of Games 
Played 163 52 163 
 
 It can be seen that there are 163 Serie A games and 52 Champion 
League games played in the time span. Share prices and index can be 
categorized into two types: match day data and non-match day data. Match 
day data are mainly used in all analysis of this paper. 
 Betting odds are used as proxies for investor's ex-ante belief of the 
game outcomes. Such proxy is broadly used in previous research (e.g., 
Brown and Hartzell (2001), and Palonino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005)). 
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They give objective measures of forecast using the expertise of the betting 
company; in turn reflect investor's expectation. The betting odds are obtained 
from www.betexplorer.com. The website provides odds for home wins, 
draws and home loses for both Champion League and Serie A matches. 
Table 2 summarizes the data we use for the analysis. 
Table 2 Betting Odds and Probabilities for the Match Outcome 
Date Teams Result Betting odds Mark-up Probability 1 X 2 
25/2/03 Juventus-Manchester  0:3 2.04 3.1 3.55 1.094 0.4479 0.2947 0.2574 
4/12/05 Fiorentina-Juventus 1:2 3.09 2.99 2.26 1.101 0.2941 0.3039 0.4021 
5/4/06 Juventus-Arsenal 0:0 1.84 3.32 3.89 1.102 0.4933 0.2734 0.2333 
   
 We calculate the mark-up for each game and then subsequently yield 
the probability of winning, drawing and losing. Table 3 provides an example. 
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OddOddOdd
Odd
111
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++
=                                          (1) 
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111
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=                                        (2) 
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OddOddOdd
Odd
111
1
++
=                                         (3) 
Table 3 Points Calculation: An Example 
Teams Actual Points Expected Points Unexpected Points 
Juventus-Manchester 0 1.6384 -1.6384 
Fiorentina-Juventus 3 1.5100 1.4900 
Juventus-Arsenal 1 1.7532 0.7532 
 
 For example, on 25th Feb 2003, Juventus played against Manchester 
United at home. The odds were 2.04, 3.1 and 3.55 for a home win, a draw 
and a home loss respectively. It means a bettor can put $1 on a Juventus lose; 
he will receive $3.55 if Juventus turns out to lose. From the odds, we see that 
Juventus was the slight favor. We get the mark-up of 1.094 for the game by 
1/2.04+1/3.1+1/3.55. Thus the probability of a home win is 44.79% (1/ (2.04 
×1.094)), a draw of 29.47% and a loss of 25.74%. In a football match, a team 
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receives 3, 1 or 0 points respectively when it wins draws or loses. As the 
result, the expected point of Juventus in this game is 1.6384 
(3×44.97+1×29.47%). It turned out that Juventus lost the game and 
consequently received 0 point. The expectation error resulted is therefore -
1.6384 (0-1.6384). Hence there was a downwards pressure on the stock 
price. 
 Stadtmann (2006) finds that other factors such as a player renewing 
his contract, players exchanging, hiring new players do not appear to 
significantly influence the share price of a football club. These variables are 
not included in the regressions in this paper. 
 
Regression Results 
 Stationary of the two time-series (share price of Juventus and index 
of the Milan exchange) are tested first. In general, financial time-series such 
as equity price and index are typically non-stationary. Standard ADF test is 
conducted to test for unit roots. It appears that neither of the logged series is 
stationary. However, the first differences of both logged series turn out to be 
stationary. Therefore, the percentage change of both variables (1st difference 
of the logged series) is used for regressions. 
 Let Juventus share price, Milan exchange index and their first 
differences be dependent variables. We run regressions of them on time 
trend. Part A presents four residual graphs from regressions. By looking at 
the graphs, log series of stock price and index are clearly not stationary and 
the lagged log series seem to be white noise processes. Thus we run further 
tests on the lagged series to see if they truly are stationary. In order to use the 
ADF tests, we need to determine the optimal lag length. We test down from 
high orders and examine the t-values on coefficients until we can reject the 
null hypothesis of the coefficient equals to zero. The plot of four variables 
against time are presented below. 
 
LJUV 
 
LJUV is the logarithm series of the index 
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LINDEX 
 
LINDEX is the logarithm series of Juventus’ share price 
 
DLJUV 
 
DLJUV is the 1st difference series of Juventus’ share price 
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DLINDEX is the 1st difference series of the index. 
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Table 4 illustrates how to choose the best lag length. The first row in 
each cell represents the coefficient. The corresponding t-value is in 
parenthesis. The sign # denotes that null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 
10% significance level. 
Table 4: Choosing the Best Lag Length 
DLJUV as the dependent 
var Lag 4 Lag 3 Lag 2 
δ0 Constant 
0.011800 
(2.883726) 
0.011172 
(2.740183) 
0.010971 
(2.703642) 
δ1 Time trend 
-8.00E-06 
(-2.398541) 
-7.57E-06 
(-2.274777) 
-7.44E-06 
(-2.242816) 
δ2 LJUV(-1) 
-0.013684 
(-3.388023) 
-0.013078 
(-3.251646) 
-0.012874 
(-3.217628) 
δ3 DLJUV(-1) 
0.129830 
(4.405609) 
0.130038 
(4.410717) 
0.131255 
(4.469803) 
δ4 DLJUV(-2) 
0.084310 
(2.836648) 
0.088262 
(2.977259) 
0.090205 
(3.067962) 
δ5 DLJUV(-3) 
0.009117# 
(0.306146) 
0.015370 
(0.519689) N/A 
δ6 DLJUV(-4) 
0.051014# 
(1.725279) N/A N/A 
 
 It is clear that lag 4 and lag 3 can be deleted. The best lag length is 2 
for DLJUV, as the null hypothesis of the coefficients of lag 2 and lag 1 equal 
to zero are rejected at 10% significance level. 
 Table 5 illustrates ADF test for DLJUV. Null hypothesis can be 
rejected at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels as t-statistic is lower than 
critical values. Thus, series LJUV has not got a unit root. It is stationary. 
Table 5 ADF Test for DLJUV 
Null Hypothesis: DLJUV has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant 
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=2) 
 t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -17.33147  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.435831  
 
5% level  -2.863848  
10% level  -2.568050  
 
Regress stock price on index first. 
310 DLINDEXDLJUV ββ += ,                                                                      (4) 
where DLJUV is the percentage change of the share prices and DLINDEX is 
the percentage change of the market index. 
 Table 6 shows the first set of regression results. The first row in each 
cell represents the coefficient; the corresponding t-value is in parenthesis. *, 
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**, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 % level.The sign ＾ denotes loss of 
the first observation in the sample data. 
Table 6: Regression Results I 
  Reg 1a Reg 1b Reg 2 Reg 3 
β0 Constant -0.00096 
(1.45919) 
-0.00423 
(1.28233) 
-0.009737 
(-1.62354) 
0.005937 
(0.394985) 
β1 DLINDEX 0.306895*** 
(4.25978) 
0.783111*** 
(3.013277) 
0.778522*** 
(2.941878) 
0.766285*** 
(2.867217) 
β2 JCACT  
 
 
 
0.004466 
(1.523886) 
0.008836* 
(1.678855) 
β3 JCEXP   
 
-0.014968 
(-1.333336) 
β6 JIACT   0.00221 
(0.805299) 
0.002191 
(0.597925) 
β7 JIEXP    -0.007713 
(-0.84345) 
 Obs. 1151 213 212＾ 212＾ 
 R2 0.019238 0.158706 0.164617 0.170815 
 Adj R2 0.018384 0.154719 0.152568 0.150689 
 Prob. F-test 0.000002 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 
 We find that from since the club went IPO in Dec 2001, on average 
share price deviates 0.3% for every 1% change in the index. The coefficient 
β1 appears to be much larger if we use the match day sample. The share price 
increases 0.7% for every 1% increase in the index. Nevertheless we can 
separate the effects of common market conditions from the variables we 
want to examine by working on Regression 4b. Thus we regard it as our 
benchmark regression. 
 In line with the method used by Georg Stadtmann (2006), we add 
variables to the benchmark model in the match day data. First the actual 
results are added. 
JIACTJCACTDLINDEXDLJUV 6210 ββββ +++= ,                               (5) 
where JCACT is the actual points gained by Juventus in Champion League, 
and JIACT is the actual points gained by Juventus in Serie A. Using t-
statistics, the null hypothesis of coefficient of the actual variable β2/β6 equals 
to zero cannot be rejected at 10% significance level in both cases. The 
findings coincide with the theory that actual results do not affect share price 
directly. Also with respect to the goodness-of-fit of the regressions, when 
comparing Regression 4b with Regression 5, we find that the adjusted R2 
drops from 0.1547 to 0.1526 when adding the actual match results. 
 We then include expected results in the regression, i.e., 
JIEXPJIACTJCEXPJCACTDLINDEXDLJUV 763210 ββββββ +++++=     (6) 
where JCEXP represents the expected points gained by Juventus in 
Champion League, and JIEXP represents the expected points gained by 
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Juventus in Serie A. The coefficient of JCEXP or JIEXP β3/β7 does not 
significantly differ to zero, so these variables do not have an influence on 
share prices either. We go on to conduct a hypothesis test that: Ho:
7632 , ββββ −=−= . Table 7 shows the result of Wald Test. 
 Table 7: Wald Test Ho: 5342 , ββββ −=−=  
Wald Test: Null Hypothesis: 5342 , ββββ −=−=  
Test Statistic Value D.F Probability 
F-statistic 0.270093 (2, 206) 0.7636 
Chi-square 0.540187 2 0.7633 
 
 H0 cannot be rejected at 10% significance level, as probability is 
much bigger than 10%. Wald test concludes that Ho can not be rejected on a 
1% confidence level. 
 As the result, it is reasonable to combine the actual match points and 
the expected match points into a sole variable, i.e. the unexpected match 
points, to replace the two variables in the regression. 
JIUNEXPJCUNEXPDLINDEXDLJUV 8410 ββββ +++=                       
(7) 
where JCUNEXP represents the unexpected points gained by Juventus in 
Champion League, and JIUNEXP represents the unexpected points gained 
by Juventus in Serie A. 
Table 8 presents the second set of regression results. Denotation is the 
same as that in Table 6. 
Table 8: Regression Results II 
  Reg 4 Reg 5 
β0 Constant -0.00466 
(-1.44809) 
-0.00449 
(-1.38457) 
β1 DLINDEX 0.771345*** 
(2.876016) 
0.769767*** 
(2.887572) 
β4 JCUNEXP 0.008341* 
(1.670473) 
0.008341* 
(1.66713) 
β8 JIUNEXP 0.002009 
(0.557663) 
0.001888 
(0.531522) 
β10 IIUNEXP  -0.00292 
(-1.00494) 
 Obs. 212＾ 212＾ 
 R2 0.168966 0.17212 
 Adj R2 0.15698 0.156123 
 Prob. F-test 0.000000 0.000000 
 
 We reject that the hypothesis that β4 is zero at 10% significance level. 
We safely say there is a correlation relationship between the Champion 
League unexpected points and the stock price. The coefficients for Serie A 
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are otherwise statistically zero. Therefore the findings support that European 
matches have a role in affecting the share price. Furthermore, from the sign 
of β4 we confirm the former hypothesis that: A surprised won match should 
influence stock prices positively, and a surprised lost match should influence 
stock prices negatively. The finding that unexpected game points from 
Italian national league do not have an impact on the stock price does 
coincide with the claim that European games matter more. 
 As a major competitor to Juventus in Serie A, we argue that the 
performances of Inter Milan can have some effects on Juventus’ stock price. 
If there exists some inter team relationship, the unexpected successes in 
Inter’s games can potentially have some knock-on effects. Here we add one 
more variable: unexpected points gained for Inter Milan (IIUNEXP) in Serie 
A. 
IIUNEXPJIUNEXPJCUNEXPDLINDEXDLJUV 108410 βββββ ++++=          (8) 
 We get similar regression results for JCUNEXP and JIUNEXP as in 
Regression (7). They both take positive values as we expected. Furthermore, 
the t-statistic of β8 is very small, so β8 is not significantly different from zero. 
The coefficient of IIUNEXP β10 takes a negative sign. It implies that an 
unexpected success of Inter has a negative impact on the share prices of 
Juventus, although this indirect effect is negligible in statistical term. The 
adjusted R-square is 0.156123, in other words there is an explanation degree 
of 15.6%，which is quite high for a financial regression. 
 So far, we run the regressions based on match day data set only (212 
observations after adjustments). These regressions exam the effect of 
unexpected game results on the trading day immediately following the 
match. Another interesting question would be whether these results have 
some lasting impact on the stock price, i.e. do they influence the stock prices 
for more than one trading day. To address it, we decide to include the lagged 
independent variables of the JCUNEXP, JIUNEXP and IIUNEXP in our 
regression as additional variables and we use all trading days stock prices 
regardless whether there is a match or not. In first step, we perform 
Regression (9) with the full range data (1151 observations after adjustments), 
set all non-match day unexpected points to be 0. 
IIUNEXPJIUNEXPJCUNEXPDLINDEXDLJUV 108410 βββββ ++++=     (9b) 
Table 9: Regression Results III 
    Reg 4a Reg 9b Reg 10 
β0 Constant -0.000964 
(-1.459188) 
-0.001252 
(-1.932677) 
-0.001311 
(-2.021555) 
β1 DLINDEX 0.306895*** 
(-4.25978) 
0.293408*** 
(-4.056152) 
0.296815*** 
(-4.109671) 
β4 JCUNEXP 
  
0.008561** 
(-2.524984) 
0.008555** 
(-2.520994) 
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β5 JCUNEXP(-1)          -0.004066 
(-1.209691) 
β8 JIUNEXP       0.007054*** 
(-3.463394) 
0.007065*** 
(-3.464145) 
β9 JIUNEXP(-1)          0.001208 
(-0.732044) 
β10 IIUNEXP        -0.001783 
(-1.007301) 
-0.001785 
(-1.00701) 
β11 IIUNEXP(-1)           0.001792 
(-1.159581) 
  Obs. 1151 1151 1151 
  R2 0.019238 0.045148 0.048765 
  Adj R2 0.018384 0.041816 0.042939 
  Prob. F-test 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 
 The results are pretty much inline with the Regression (9), except that 
t-statistic for JIUNEXP appears to be much higher, consequently the variable 
seems to have an impact on share price. 
 Because of its characteristics, equity market react to new information 
extremely fast, any opportunity is quickly arbitrated away. We therefore 
believe the surprise factor can last beyond 3, 4 days. We only test whether 
any signals do carry over to the subsequent trading day. The regression is 
represented below. 
 DLJUV(+1)=β0+β1DLINDEX(+1)+β4JCUNEXP(+1)+β5JCUNEXP
+β8JIUNEXP(+1)+ β9 JIUNEXP +β10 IIUNEXP(+1)+ β11 IIUNEXP 
 In days following match days, JCUNEXP (+1), JIUNEXP (+1) and 
IIUNEXP (+1) are set to be zero, the only variables other than index could 
influence DLJUV (+1) are previous days match results. If coefficients of 
those are not zero, we could say there are some lasting effects. Otherwise we 
conclude there is none. In match days, the regression converts to Regression 
(9). In all other days, all variables except index are zero. Thus it is assumed 
only the index affects stock price at these times. We include all the sample 
dates (1151 observations after adjustments). We transform the regression 
equation a little to get 
 DLJUV=β0+β1DLINDEX+β4JCUNEXP 
 +β5JCUNEXP(-1)+β8JIUNEXP 
 +β9JIUNEXP(-1)+β10IIUNEXP+β11IIUNEXP(-1)                          (9) 
 Table shows that all the coefficients of the lagged variables 
JCUNEXP (-1), JIUNEXP (-1) and IIUNEXP (-1) are not significantly 
different from zero, which means that all the impacts are short-lived; none of 
them last for more than one day. We are able to conclude that there is no 
persistency in the match related variables. It does make sense since in 
general any financial arbitrary is quickly corrected by hedge funds. If we 
only look at the signs of lagged coefficients, Champion League has an 
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opposite sign to its normal coefficient. It suggests that it may have an 
overshooting behavioral, whereas Serie A data does oppositely. However 
these behavioral are so small that we can ignore them. 
 
Section 5. The Reversed News Model 
 In this section, we use an alternative approach called the reversed 
news model (see Ellison, Mullin 2001). It is normal practice in the financial 
literature to identify the explanatory variables first and then to check if they 
indeed work empirically. It is mentioned in the Georg Stadtmann (2006), 
after the straight forward approach, an opposite one should be taken to check 
for original model’s robustness. As expressed in the name, this approach first 
identify any outliner cannot be explained by the market conditions, then 
search for any major event which can be linked to these abnormal changes. 
Georg Stadtmann (2006) used it to investigate the drivers of stock price of a 
publicly trading German football club. They found “one advantage of the 
reversed news model is that this method is an appropriate way to identify 
‘forgotten’ news categories ... an omitted variable bias can be 
circumvented”.2 
 We bring back the benchmark regression in the news model with the 
full time span (20/12/2001-31/5/2006). 
DLINDEXDLJUV 10 ββ +=                                                                      (4a)                                    
 We collect the residual series, and sort them by their absolute values. 
(Insert Table 7 here) We pick out the largest 20 residuals and try to identify 
events which could possibly link with these dates. We highlight two events 
below. 
 
Juventus Moved to the Top of Serie A (24 February, 2003) 
 Juventus and Inter Milan have long been regarded as two major 
players in the Italian Serie A. From 1998 to 2001, Juventus has been 
championed once and been second place twice, whereas Inter Milan has been 
second place 2 times and always stayed at top five. Before 21st round match 
of season 02-03, Juventus trial Inter Milan three points in the overall table. 
On the night of 16 Feb 2003, Juventus beat Parma 2-1 to gain the three 
points, whereas in the previous day Inter lost to Chievo Verona. Juventus 
subsequently moved level with Inter at the top of Serie A, and was looking 
as favorite to win the league. In Round 22, Juventus beat opponents for the 
full points. They sat comfortably in the top. This injected a boost to the 
investor’s confidence. So when new hit the market, share price was pushed 
up by 18.48%.  
                                                          
2 Georg Stadtmann (2006): Frequent News and Pure Signals: The Case of a Publicly Traded 
Football Club, pp.19, Paragraph 3. 
European Scientific Journal April 2015 edition vol.11, No.10  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
32 
Phone-Tapping Scandal (May, 2006) 
 Another piece of news which resulted in a series of extreme reactions 
of share price was the phone-tap scandal. On 4th May 2006, Italian press 
leaked a telephone conversation between Juventus’ general manager Luciano 
Moggi and one of Italian football officials. It brought up allegations of 
collusion in appointing referees for Juventus games. In the next few days, the 
price of Juventus went to rock bottom. On 11th May, the whole board of the 
club resigned just days after club’s president and vice- president quit over the 
allegation. Press claimed that Juventus was in crisis as the club went into 
investigation. In the wake of this biggest scandal since the 1980s, Italian 
football official forced to investigate its internal affairs and brought the 
scope of this affair cover almost entire Italian football industry. The continue 
knock-on effect was reflected in Juventus’ share price. Over the next 19 
trading days since 4th May, Juventus’ share price has dropped by more than 
57%. On 16th May alone, almost 20% of its value’s been scrapped. 
 
Section 6. Conclusion 
 Using the news model, we conclude that the unexpected match 
outcomes play an important role in driving the stock prices of a publicly 
traded football club. Champion League games have a stronger effect on the 
share price than national league games. European matches generate much 
high revenues (bigger sponsorships, high broadcasting fees etc.), so these 
games weight more typically. In the mean time, these effects are not 
sustained. Although the evidence indicates that national league has negligible 
impact in our case, others did find a link there (Georg Stadtmann (2006)). 
This approach is very straight forward, but it is easy to miss some important 
variables that way. Therefore we then applied reversed news model. The data 
tell us besides the match related variables, corporate governance related 
event can interfere with the stock price. With both types of variables 
incorporated into the stock price, there still exist big errors that can not be 
explained by models. To improve on this, one can separate the effects on 
unexpected win and loss (Alex Edmans, Diego García and Øyvind Norli 
(2006)); on the other hand, we can use betting exchange prices (e.g. prices 
from www.betfair.com) instead of betting odds. Gennaro Bernile and Evgeny 
Lyandres (2008) suggested that because most investors of publicly traded 
football clubs are their fans, their ex-ante belief about the match outcomes 
tend to be biased. They tend to be over optimistic before the games and end 
up being more disappointed if they lose. This biasness in ex-ante belief 
cannot be reflected by betting odds. We argue that the betting exchange price 
is a better proxy for investor’s belief. It is able to capture investor’s mood 
more precisely. We did find some betting prices went back to 2004, but with 
limited data, it became too difficult for us to use them instead. 
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Section 7. Appendix 
Table 10: 20 Largest Residuals and Their Linked Events 
No. Date Price 
Reaction* 
Event Category 
 
1 16/05/2006 -0.194557 Phone-tap scandal CG 
2 24/02/2003 0.184784 Juventus move to the top of Serie A MO 
3 03/03/2003 0.142817 N/A  
4 15/05/2006 -0.138845 Phone-tap scandal CG 
5 19/05/2006 -0.126749 Phone-tap scandal CG 
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6 26/04/2006 0.124147 
Juventus set to clinch their second 
successive Serie A title MO 
7 27/02/2003 0.110167 N/A  
8 20/04/2006 0.107119 
Juventus set to clinch their second 
successive Serie A title MO 
9 24/05/2006 0.098010 N/A  
10 07/03/2003 0.098005 N/A  
11 11/04/2006 0.096942 
Juventus set to clinch their second 
successive Serie A title MO 
12 26/02/2003 -0.096785 N/A  
13 29/05/2003 -0.092097 
Juventus lose out in champion league final 
to AC Milan on penalty MO 
14 11/05/2006 -0.089382 Phone-tap scandal CG 
15 10/04/2006 0.084807 
Juventus set to clinch their second 
successive Serie A title MO 
16 18/05/2005 0.083347 Bid rumour for the club CG 
17 18/05/2006 -0.083032 Phone-tap scandal CG 
18 09/10/2002 -0.082379 N/A  
19 12/04/2006 -0.078621 N/A  
20 23/05/2005 -0.077935 N/A  
CG: Corporate Governance related news. MO: Match Outcome related news. *Price reaction 
of Juventus stocks, not explained by overall market reaction. N/A.: no news identified. 
 
Abbreviations 
JUV = stock price of Juventus  
INDEX = index of Juventus on Milan Stock Exchange 
JCACT = actual points of Juventus in Champion League 
JCEXP = expected points of Juventus in Champion League 
JCUNEXP = unexpected points of Juventus in Champion League 
JIACT = actual points of Juventus in Italian Serie A 
JIEXP = expected points of Juventus in Italian Serie A 
JIUNEXP = unexpected points of Juventus in Italian Serie A 
IIUNEXP = unexpected points of Inter Milan in Italian Serie A 
LINDEX = log(INDEX) 
LJUV = log(JUV) 
DLINDEX = LINDEX - LINDEX(-1) 
DLJUV = LJUV - LJUV(-1) 
 
  
